Dr Robert Johnson is the founding Director of Oxford's Strategy, Statecraft, and Technology (Changing Character of War) Centre (SST-CCW), an interdisciplinary research centre based at Pembroke College. Until the summer he was on secondment to the UK's Ministry of Defence as Director of the office of net assessment and challenge. He is now back in Oxford and manages a busy visiting fellows programme and seminar series, held at All Souls during Term Time and to which everyone is welcome. What follows is a statement Dr Johnson delivered on November 20, 2024, to UK Parliamentarians, upon their request.
The United Kingdom's Foreign and Defence Policy, 2025-2075 An Address to Parliamentarians
There is a global fracture line, extending from Central-South America in the West, through sub-Saharan Africa, up through the Levant, the Caucasus, across the Black Sea and Ukraine's borders, down through Iraq and the Gulf, running across Iran and Afghanistan, up the border of Pakistan and India, along the India- China border, then around the South China Sea (and China's so-called 9 Dash Line), through the Taiwan Strait and across the 38th Parallel of Korea. It is marked by severe effects of climatic change, conflict, human insecurity, bad governance, resource deprivation, extremism, and aggression.
More seriously, there is intensifying competition and state coercion - marked by the intended displacement of American and British global leadership by China and Russia, with their confederates, Iran, North Korea, and others, but which is manifest as the displacement of confrontation, like the Cold War, from Europe into this global fracture line.
The Office of Net Assessment, which I had the honour to establish and lead in MOD, set out to identify the UK's strategic advantage through comparative diagnostic study over time, against a variety of themes: economic, financial, scientific and technological, as well as in foreign policy, and in defence. The verdict from the work we carried out over two years is that the strategic outlook for the United Kingdom is deteriorating, but it is recoverable if action is taken.
The grand strategy of United Kingdom has been to uphold its enduring interests and fulfil its global obligations, but the rules-based international system (RBIS), which has maintained prosperity and peace between the major powers of the world, is being replaced, as we speak, by the new Chinese global order. In the next four years, America will almost certainly prioritise its own interests and they will likely refuse to fulfil many of their existing international agreements, leaving room for China's further assertiveness in global affairs and its ingress in all economic life. China prefers to buy off its rivals, purchase loyalties by placing its sympathisers in positions of authority, and covertly eroding confidence in our own leaders, institutions, and authorities. Against a range of indicators, some military (like the build-up of its navy, now the world's largest) but most economic (such as stockpiling and hoarding critical minerals and metals), it is clearly preparing the ground for a more muscular and aggressive policy towards the free nations of this world.
The UK cannot escape its global responsibilities, including those in Eurasia. The fracture line around the world and any events in East Asia, in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and in Europe will directly affect the United Kingdom. If the attacks on global shipping in the Red Sea by the Houthi proxies of Iran have already cost the UK economy millions, and if the wholesale price of gas and oil has increased by billions because of Russian aggression, then one can imagine the costs of coercion in a major confrontation; Chinese domination of global manufacturing holds the economy of this country at risk in ways we never saw during the Cold War.
The government has correctly identified that NATO is an important burden sharing source of power and the desire is to prioritise our regional defence. The government has embarked on a SDR to examine the best way to integrate the armed forces, apply digitalisation, reform acquisition and procurement, and address concerns in financial and business management by Defence. The government rightly identifies, too, that national resilience is a concern.
The UK's critical national infrastructure, such as pipelines, ports, and airports, are, regretfully, undefended: we have preciously little integrated air and missile defence sufficient to protect our cities and our vital assets, we have no hardened facilities beyond the four operational nuclear shelters (in the 1980s, we had 256), we have no civil defence programme, and proportionally we have the fewest number of reservists of any European country. Our supply chains are global but we lack the means, with only 19 combatant naval vessels (compared with the 50 we had in 1990), to cover the Atlantic, North Sea, High North, Mediterranean, and other vital waterways.
The SDR is unlikely to address in any detail the vulnerability of our supply chains and our infrastructure security. Its remit does not cover foreign policy nor economic safeguards for the country. There is a commitment to the nuclear enterprise and to enhance our SSN fleet, for the purposes of deterrence, in order to avoid conflict, but we have not yet come to terms with the full implications of Russian and Chinese assertiveness around the world, the drawdown of American support to Europe (and potential trade war), or, more positively, the opportunities afforded by AUKUS and GCAP. My point is that is it is vital to see the defence of the UK not only in terms of military means: we must see all the strands together - economic, financial, diplomatic, military, and in terms of homeland and human security.
The current defence budget has not proven sufficient to maintain the existing conventional force. It was estimated by the last government that it would take £10 billion to fix the problems in the current force and there was a realisation, at the end, that 2.5% of GDP was the minimum that be required to maintain the force at its current strength and size. Unfortunately, underinvestment has put modernisation work at risk and the small quantities of defence assets and capabilities represent a diseconomy of scale. But we must now think to the future, and on a larger scale than in the peace dividend years of the post-Cold War era. Critics will argue that our defence review must be realistic. Our track record in defence reviews since 1981 is, however, far from exemplary. In 1981, cuts were made and yet, within 12 months, the UK found itself sending an expeditionary force to liberate the people of the Falklands and in doing so lost four warships, nine aircraft, and over 220 military personnel. In Options for Change, the review of 1990, we made cuts of 18% the armed forces and ended our civil defence programme, and yet the UK was engaged in the Gulf War which involved over 53,000 personnel who were placed under a CBRN (chemical-biological - nuclear-radiological) threat.
The 1998 SDR made further reductions, with the Royal Navy down to 32 warships, the RAF reduced by two squadrons, and the army was brought down to just two divisions. We imagined that we would face only one large scale intervention operation and a small peacekeeping deployment at the same time. What we got was 9/11 and the global War on Terror that required 100,000 personnel, and which placed the armed forces under immense strain. But we did not face a state threat, let alone two, for the majority of that period. The Conservative 2010 SDSR review made even more severe cuts than in the past and even scrapped the U.K.'s maritime patrol aircraft that watch the North Atlantic against submarine threats, while reducing the Royal Navy to just 19 surface ships. Four years later Russia invaded Crimea, and we were subjected to brazen assassinations on British soil by Russian intelligence. While we could manage small scale Russian incidents, without maritime patrol aircraft we had no way to monitor the Russian submarine fleet, which is now more active, and their surveillance ships reconnoitring our pipelines and data cables in the North Sea. In 2021, we finally recognised the importance of taking an integrated approach to our national defences, one that combined defence, foreign policy, humanitarian aid, and national resilience. For the first time since the Cold War, there was an increase in the defence budget. A year later, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and we found our assumption about munitions stocks woefully inadequate. This Integrated Review was then updated in light of Russia's continued aggression, and China's growing assertiveness against the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
China is using the front of businesses and ready cash to win over countries in the developing world, and, indeed, in the developed world. It places Chinese in our leading universities, and has engaged in the greatest heist of Intellectual Property in global history. It buys up strategic ports, and then imposes terms on debt- ridden partners. It offers peacekeepers, making that support conditional on the right to exclude certain nations of the West from the same mission. To all intents and purposes, China is now a Leviathan power. Its debt trap strategy has afflicted South Asia, Africa, and will now affect Latin America. It is striking that the UN Secretary-General chose not to go to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, but instead attended the BRICS summit. Like the WHO, there is obedience to Beijing in this new world order. Crucially, China is now a main supplier of Russia in its war against Ukraine, as are Iran and North Korea.
The UK supported Ukraine on the principles of self defence, respect for neutrality, border integrity, and as a signatory to Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. The UK was the first to send arms to aid Ukraine and had declared that it would stand by the Ukrainians 'as long as it takes.' Russia's attempted coup de main was thwarted and Putin found himself in a war he did not expect. In aiding Kyiv, the UK was ensuring that the Russians' aggression left Moscow fixed. This was the perfect opportunity to buy time for the UK to regenerate its own military capabilities and to make itself ready for whatever came next.
But no meaningful preparations were made. No one believed the threat would go any further. The UK's defence industrial base remains very small. It possesses almost no munitions factories (while Finland has six). The UK has no CBRN capabilities beyond that of managing a small incident. It has no mobilisation plan. Indeed, UK citizens would not know what to do in the event of a major crisis. The Civil Defence contingencies' war books, maintained annually in the Cold War, have not been updated. The UK lacks the capacity to regenerate force. If we suffered losses on the scale of the Falkland Islands, our Armed Forces would be combat effective for matter of a few weeks. Our munition supply would be exhausted in a fortnight. It is understandable that the government would wish to address economic justice, social justice, the environment, the provision of essential public services, and issues of global human rights. There are many demands on the budget.
However, the successive underinvestment in defence and 30 years or more of cuts in one form or another have led to one fundamental and uncomfortable truth: if the United Kingdom finds itself in a major armed conflict, it would suffer severe setbacks and would be unable to regenerate its forces. Worse, it would be subject to such intense economic and financial pressure, that, I regret to say, this nation would face a defeat. There are always vested interests who will tell you that their interpretation of UK defence is correct. Certain journalists and retired military personnel are fond of demanding more tanks, more ships, more aircraft, more personnel, and more money. That is not my purpose. The situation is far more grave from the grand strategic point of view than any numbers of assets, people, percentages, or cash can reasonably represent. The UK has always tried to minimise its defence expenditure in times of peace, in order to maximise its growth and prosperity. But this was always done on the basis that we would convert some of our wealth in times of crisis or rising threat to reinforce our defences. Poland, Sweden, Finland, the Baltic countries, and Romania have all increased their defence budgets in face of the threat posed by Russia, and its Chinese and Iranian partners.
What is to be done? How do we address the trend of deterioration? We can take a long term approach, to spread the costs of our national defences. Some things we can do right away, not least in resurrecting our schemes for homeland defence and resilience. The Cabinet Office tell me they had a plan in gestation. Where is the implementation? Some reserve capacity and a range of contingency options would be a better precaution. Engaging the public here will be crucial.
The government's adherence to NATO is a wise decision; but let us remember that only one campaign since 1990, in south-east Europe, has involved NATO. All the other recent campaigns have taken place somewhere along the global fracture line. Today, the regions of greatest threat to the United Kingdom are the High North and North Atlantic, the vulnerability of the flow of supply to the United Kingdom from around the world (95% which comes across the seas), the threat to our hydrocarbons supplies from the Middle East and through the Mediterranean, and the threats towards our islands and overseas territories, and to our Commonwealth allies. In addition, our desire to support the humanitarian issues of the world mean that we are more likely to ask our armed forces to operate outside of the Euro Atlantic region.
Let us also remember that the bulk of our trade and supply now comes from outside of Europe and our technological relationships are with the United States and with East Asia. The steady if slow growth of European defences, including the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, means that our gaze should not be 'down and in', in Europe, but 'up and out' in the world.
The AUKUS programme of submarine construction with Australia and the Global Combat Air Programme of next generation aircraft, with Japan and Italy, are ripe for expansion, for UK companies and jobs. In the Oxford-Durham-Cambridge research group that we have built, we have staged two major AUKUS dialogue events for industry, academics, and government personnel. There is so much potential there just waiting for government leadership.
So, in summary:
The first solution is to maintain our nuclear deterrent. Hidden deep beneath the waves, on constant readiness 24/7, and backed by the will of our political leaders to use it if we had to defend ourselves against an existential attack, it is the ultimate symbol of our global leadership. The dedication our Royal Naval crews is phenomenal and I urge you to visit them and thank them for their exemplary service to our country.
The second solution is to remain close to our allies, by demonstrating our capability, our good faith, and our staunch commitment. We should weigh our responsibilities carefully, then, once decided, show our full and enduring faithfulness.
The third solution is to adhere to our national style in strategy, namely 'balance.' We seek balance international affairs, a balanced and reasonable judgement in our foreign policy; when threatened, we look to rebalance by opening new pressures against aggressors. That means we do not seek to change international affairs, but we will, as a nation, act with resolution if we are forced to do so.
The fourth solution is to address the weaknesses and vulnerabilities we know exist in our country. Do we appeal to the United States, our principal ally? Or have we damaged that relationship by the neglect of what America expects of us?
There are other pressing questions:
Can we defend the northern European and North Atlantic region? I have personally committed to building a Nordic-Baltic net assessment strategic planning unit with regional governments, and I am committed to the professional education of UK and NATO personnel, but have we acknowledged our responsibilities fully? Are we seen in Europe as a leader in defence and security? Surveys that I have conducted in the last two years suggests we are not, yet so many national representatives want us to be.
Can we regenerate our national power in the event of a major crisis? Could we implement a drive into automated manufacturing, to compete with China, augment our small industrial base, and equip ourselves with a technical workforce for the future prosperity of the UK - planned out over50 years? And could we implement a resilience agenda over the next 50 years, which includes a scheme of volunteers to deal with floods, mass contamination, pandemic, and, in extremis, with armed drone attacks on UK cities and ports?
Can we finally reform our acquisition and procurement, and the bloated civil service rules, to make things more efficient and therefore cheaper in the long run?
This final question is: Can we bring the British public into our confidence? We do not want to frighten the public. No one wants that. But the public expect the government to defend the nation. The problem is that governments don't defend nations - the people do. Our recent Remembrance commemorations remind us that it is the public who fill the ranks of the armed forces, make selections on what they buy and how they prepare, and look after each other in times of crisis. Governments can incentivise, organise, and galvanise that.
The global situation is less stable, and state actors are actively eroding the UK's interests, and our higher interests (in terms of global stability, good governance, responsible management of mass migration, and peace-building). Our professionalised armed forces, configured for small scale interventions, are insufficient for the world we are now in. While financial responsibility is what we need in peacetime, the global situation requires us to think more long term, to be less reactive to events and instead to shape them, and to be proactive now in standing up to Russian and Chinese threats. We cannot make our national grand strategy 'money-led' - it must be led by our national purpose.
Let us get 'To action':
Use all the levers of national power in a coordinated way, plan longer term, and determine what sort of role the UK will play in the world;
Let us attach funding to each long term project that addresses our weaknesses;
Let's change the incentives: HMT rules in MOD leads to waste and civil service incentives are not to deliver, even though they control plans and procurement;
But let us also take confidence in our nuclear power, remain valuable to our allies as a capable conventional force, seek balance in international affairs, address our weaknesses in a businesslike fashion, and seize the opportunities each of these themes throws up, especially with the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and Europe. And let us embrace the public, from their desire to volunteer, their concern for humanitarian issues, and the jobs and prosperity that defence offers us all. You can bring them into your confidence.
Finally, what attention should be paid to the Russian ambassador's recent threatening remarks? Immediately, we require a clear joint statement, and active, visible preparations, including deployments and exercises, and the accelerated restocking of our armaments and forces.
The situation is so serious that a few more items for defence is not enough. It requires a national endeavour in homeland defence, our national defence industry, and in national schemes that link our universities, businesses, and the public.
To afford it, we can spread the cost over the coming years. Deterrence will be more expensive, but war is unthinkably costly. A single year of conflict would be £380bn. A three to four year war would cost around £1.5 tr. Deterrence, with a modest armed force, we can offer for £65-70bn.
The solution is not to be scared, but prepared.
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